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AFTER BALI: CAN THE WARSAW CONVENTION BE




S INCE THE United States became a signatory to the War-
saw Convention (Convention),' the American attitude to-
ward it has been marked with disfavor.2 The source of much
disdain is the limitation on airline liability under the Conven-
tion.' Very recently, for example, the United States Supreme
Court may have subtly registered its disfavor of the liability
limitation, though rendering a decision upholding its contin-
ued enforceability.' In this atmosphere of restrained hostil-
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 127 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934),
[hereinafter cited as Convention]. For an overview of the Convention itself and its
underlying prinicples, see notes 41-89 and accompanying text.
J See, e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 515 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Moore, J., dissenting) ("The majority do not approve of the terms of the treaty and
therefore, by judicial fiat they rewrite it. They think a 'one-sided advantage' is being
taken of the passenger .. "); see generally, Comment, The Growth of American Judicial
Hostility Towards the Liabiity Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J. AIR L. & COM.
805 (1983); Lowenfeld, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 54 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 580, 580-81 (1966) (Opening Statement of the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation
to the Montreal Conference).
See infra notes 63-89 and accompanying text.
SeeTrans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (U.S. April 17,
1984). The majority in Franklin Mtt first noted that the "Convention's framers viewed
the treaty as one 'drawn for a few years, not for one or two centuries'." The Court then
added in conclusion:
In the United States the authority to make that conversion [from the
limitations expressed in gold francs in the Convention to dollars] has
been delegated by Congress to the Executive branch. The courts are
bound to respect the arrangement [the perpetuation of the liability limi-
tations through their conversion into dollars based on the last official
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ity, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has raised, sua sponle,5
an important issue challenging the Covention's legality. In In
re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974,6 the Ninth Cir-
cuit questioned whether the Convention's liability limitation
constitutes a taking of property without just compenstion
under the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution.7
The litigation in Bah arose following the crash of a Pan
American World Airways jetliner into a mountain near the
southern tip of the island of Bali, Indonesia.' All ninety-six
passengers and eleven crew members were killed.' The Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation"0 ordered all the suits
from this accident filed in federal courts transferred to the
United States District Court for the Central District of
Califronia.1 ' Most of the suits were settled, but wrongful
death actions filed by the survivors of three of the passengers
price of gold] unless the properly delegated authority is exercised in a
manner inconsistent with domestic or international law.
Id at 4449. Justice Stevens, in dissent, expressed his attitude toward the Convention
more directly than the majority. He stated, "though the applications of the Warsaw
Convention is anachronistic in today's world of aviation, we are obliged to enforce it so
long as the political branches of the Government adhere to the Convention." Id at
4453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
f, Sua sponle is a latin term meaning by one's own will or motion and without sugges-
tion. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (5th ed. 1979).
,; 684 F.2d 1301 (1982).
7 The fifth amendment reads in its entirety:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal.1978).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982) (authorizing transfer of civil actions involving com-
mon questions of fact to any district court). See also Herndon & Higginbotham, Com-
plex Multidistrict Litigation - An Overview of 28 US C § 1407, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 33
(1979), for an overview of multidistrict litigation.
" 462 F. Supp. at 1116.
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were not. 2 These plaintiffs rejected the limited recovery
under the Convention (for which the defendant Pan Am
would have been strictly liable once it was proven the Con-
vention applied)., 3 Instead, the plaintiffs proceeded to trial
on a negligence theory, seeking full compensatory damages
under California law completely independent of the provi-
sions of the Convention.14
The trial was bifurcated so that all issues as to the limita-
tion of damages, including the applicability of the Conven-
tion, were deferred until the jury's verdict on damages.15 The
jury assessed total damages resulting from the negligence of
the defendants at $951,000.6 The issue then remained as to
the effect of the limitation on air carrier liability under the
Convention. 17
The district court interpreted the Convention so that its
limitation on liability was not imposed. 8 The court reasoned
that the language of the Convention itself' 9 and the case law
interpreting it20 supported the proposition that the liability
limitation is contractual in nature.21 The court saw the air-
line ticket as the contract through which liability was lim-
ited.22 It concluded that such a contractual limitation on a
wrongful death action was inoperative under California law,
,2 Id
11 Id See infra text accompanying note 86.
1* See 462 F. Supp. at 1116.
1. Id.
.6 Id
17 Id. at 1117.
in Id at 1119.
19 Id. The district court's textual analysis focused upon articles 1, 3, and 22 of the
Convention. Id at 1119-20 & n. 12. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (defining
"international transportation" in terms of places of departure and destination and
stoppping places "according to the contract made by the parties"); id. at art. 3(2) (stat-
ing that loss of the passenger ticket "shall not affect the existence or the validity of the
contract of transportation" but that nondelivery of a ticket will not allow the carrier to
"avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liabil-
ity"); id at art. 22 (limiting damages to 125,000 francs but providing "by special con-
tract" for a higher limit of liability).
-o See, e.g., Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801, 811 (N.D.
Ga. 1964) (stating that since air carriers may contract for limited liability, that limita-
tion, by implication, is contractually based).
2, 462 F. Supp. at 1119.
22 Id at 1121-24.
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which interprets the action as being independent of any
rights of the deceased and not compromised by any contracts
the deceased may have made.23 The district court thus did
not reduce the verdict to the limit imposed by the
Convention.24
Pan Am appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
the district court's holding regarding the inapplicability of
the Convention. 25 The appellate court reversed the district
court's ruling on the liability limitation, holding that to the
extent that California law would prevent the application of
the Convention's limitation on liability, it had been pre-
empted by the Convention. 26 The court premised its holding
upon the fact that the limitation of airline liability was a pri-
mary purpose of the Convention when the Senate originally
ratified it.27 The court stated that any local law impeding the
execution of the objectives of Congress must yield.28
The plaintiffs cross-appealed, arguing that the Conven-
tion's liability limitation was unconstitutional in that, first,
the limitation was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to de-
prive them of substantive due process; 29 second, the limita-
tion deprived them of the equal protection of the laws;30 and
third, the limitation impermissibly burdened their constitu-
tional right to travel.3 1 The Ninth Circuit found the due pro-
cess and right to travel arguments persuasive, but it stated
that these contentions would fail if another remedy, such as a
fifth amendment "taking" claim against the United States,
were available to fully compensate victims of international
air disasters. 2 The court concluded that such a remedy
2-3 Id at 1117.
24 Id. at 1124.
2.5 In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Bai].
- Id at 1308.
27 Id at 1307-08.
2 Id. at 1307.
See Comment, Due Process, Equal Protection and the Right to Travel- Can Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention Stand Up to These Constitutional Foes,', 49 J. AIR L. & COM. 907, 922-28
(1984).
- Id. at 928-33.
3, Bali, 684 F.2d at 1309. See Comment, supra note 29, at 933-42.
32 Bali, 684 F.2d at 1310.
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would be available in the United States Claims Court.3 3 The
court, however, did not hold that there was a "taking." It
held only that the claims court had jurisdiction to hear a fifth
amendment taking claim against the United States. 4
In this context the Ninth Circuit outlined, in dicta, what it
perceived to be the proper course of events culminating in a
successful taking claim. A plaintiff must first win a verdict on
a cause of action under state law as did the plaintiffs in Bali. 5
The trial court must then impose the Convention's liability
limitations upon the damages determined under state law,
possibly resulting, in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, in a
"taking" of a portion of the claim. 36 Finally, the plaintiff
must file a "taking" claim against the United States in the
claims court.3 7
The path delineated in Bali, however, is neither certain in
its destination nor easy to traverse. This comment will ex-
amine the major legal obstacles that will appear in the deter-
mination of whether a taking has occurred. These obstacles
include the jurisdiction of the claims court a3 the fifth amend-
ment requirement of a property right,39 and the various ap-
proaches the claims court could take in addressing the taking
issue.' In order to provide an adequate background for this
endeavor, however, this comment initially focuses upon the
Convention itself.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Perhaps no single document in the history of aviation has
evoked as much controversy as the Warsaw Convention.4
Commentators have duly noted the various appeals for re-
form, the position of the American government in regard to
13 Id.
- Id. at 1315-16. See infra note 116.
- 684 F.2d at 1312.
SId at 1312-13 & n.l1.
-' Id at 1312.
-' See inhfta notes 116-157 and accompanying text.
-' See infia notes 166-232 and accompanying text.
- See infra notes 233-288 and accompanying text.
I , See generally DeVivo, The Warsaw Convention: Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell?, 49 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 71, 71-95 (1983).
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reform, and the effects of major American judicial decisions
upon the Covention's status. The following examination of
the Convention, therefore, is not a recitation of its complete
history. Rather, this perusal merely highlights those aspects
of the treaty either necessary to an understanding of, or mate-
rial to, the claims asserted by a Bah" plaintiff.
The Convention emerged from international conferences
in Paris in 1926 and Warsaw in 1929.4" These conferences
were called to prepare a legal solution to the problems antici-
pated when international civil aviation eventually reached
maturity and linked together many nations with disparate
legal systems and differing languages." The purpose of the
Convention was actually twofold.4 First, the conferees
sought to establish uniformity in the law applicable to claims
arising out of international transportation.46 Agreement was
reached as to transportation documents, 47 jurisdiction,4 the
period of limitations, 49 and the proper party defendant where
successive carriers were employed in one undivided transpor-
tation.' Second, and clearly most importantly, the conferees
sought to limit the potential liability of carriers in the event
42 See generally, e.g., Haskell, The Warsaw System and the US Constitution Revisited, 39 J.
AIR L. & COM. 483 (1973); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The UnittedStates and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967); Rhyne, International Law and Air Transportation,
47 MICH. L. REV. 41, 53-61 (1948); Comment, supra note 2, at 805.
4, Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 42, at 498.
14 Id World aviation was radically different in 1929 than it is today. Charles Lind-
berg had flown the Atlantic only two years before. Wright, The Warsaw Convention's
Damages Limitations, 6 CLFv.-MAR. L. REV. 290 (1957). Pan American was the only
American carrier flying an international route; it flew from Havana, Cuba to Key
West, Florida, a 'distance of ninety miles. Id at 291, 294. European carriers did little
more than fly very short routes linking the continent with England and Africa. Id. at
291. In fact, many at this time thought that dirigibles were the transportation mode of
the future. Id at 290.
. Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 42, at 498.
4' Id at 498-99.
" Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3 (specifications for passenger ticketing and way
bills).
48 Id. at art. 28 (providing juridiction at the carrier's domicile or principle place of
business, the carrier's place of business through which the contract was made, or at the
destination of the flight).
4 Id at art. 29 (allowing two years in which to bring an action).
- Id at arts. 1(2), 30 (the carrier actually transporting is the proper defendant where
loss occurs during the portion of the transportaion under its supervision).
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of aviation accidents. 5' This limitation was imposed at the
approximate equivalent of $8300.52
The chief purpose of the Convention, the limitation of po-
tential liability,53 obviously benefitted the air carriers, not the
passenger. 4 The drafters expected that the limitation would
aid the development of international air transportation by
shielding air carriers from the debilitating consequences of a
single catastrophe 55 and allowing carriers to obtain insurance
at more favorable rates. 6 Moreover, the drafters believed
that the scheme of limited liability under the Convention
would ultimately enable the airlines to attract the capital
necessary for their growth and development.
Though the Convention may have most favored the air-
lines, the passengers obtained advantages as well. The Con-
vention's very existence assured that one international law
would supplant the conflicting local laws and their concomi-
See Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and the Hauge Protocol, 23 J. AIR L. & COM. 253
(1956).
. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 499.
The limitation set forth in the Convention is 125,000 French francs valued in terms
of a specified content of gold. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 22. At the same
time the Convention was drafted, the official price of gold in the United States was
$20.27 per ounce and the limitation in American currency was approximately $5,000.
When the official price of gold in the United States was pegged at $35.00 per ounce,
the limitation increased to $8,291.87. See Parker, The Adequacy of the Passenger Liability
Limits of the Warsaw Convention of 1929, 14 J. AIR L. & CoM. 37, 39 (1947). See also
Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445, 4446 (U.S. April 17,
1984).
In concluding that 125,000 francs was the appropriate limitation on carrier liability,
the drafters of the Convention sought to achieve a mean economic value on human life
which would make the Convention acceptable to all the countries of the world.
Parker, supra, at 39. By increasing the number of signatory countries, the goal of uni-
formity in the law was enhanced. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 504.
To appease those developed countries, such as the United States, where a high eco-
nomic value has been placed on human life, the drafters shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant airline as a bargain for the low liability limitations. Parker, supra, at 39.
. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 499; Parker, supra note 52, at 39.
- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 500.
- Id at 499.
- Id. at 499-500 (quoting Letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to President
Roosevelt, reprinted in 1934 U.S. Avi. R. 240).
7 Id at 499. The United States ratified the Convention during the depth of the
great depression, when capital was unavailable for any industry, and certainly for the
very accident-prone airlines. 2 J. KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH
CASES, ch. 7, at 7 (1968).
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tant jurisdictional and choice of law problems.5 8 The Con-
vention also specifically prohibited any attempt to fix a lower
limit on the carriers' liability than that prescribed under its
terms. 9 Most importantly, the Convention presumed under
negligence principles6° that carriers were liable unless they
had taken all necessary measures to avoid damage or it was
impossible to do so. 6 1 In addition, the terms of the Conven-
tion precluded the imposition of the liability limitation for
damage caused by the carriers' willful misconduct.62
Although the United States did not participate in the
drafting of the Convention, it became a signatory in 1934,
one year after the Convention became effective.63 Then as
early as 1935, debates concerning revision of the Convention
commenced before international aviation forums.6' Confer-
ences discussing various subjects related to revision, and in
particular amendments increasing the liability limitation,65
were held before the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion on four occasions between 1946 and 1953,66 but no
changes occurred.67
Finally, the American public's growing indignation toward
the low liability limitation fostered a movement for the
United States to withdraw from the Convention. 68 A diplo-
matic conference consequently convened at the Hague in
1955 for the purpose of drafting amendments to the Conven-
tion.69 The American representatives at the Hague sought
maximum recoveries for victims of air disasters7 ° but suc-
ceeded in raising the limit to only $16,600, in what became
-a 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 57, ch. 7, at 7.
19 Convention, supra note 1, at art. 23.
- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 500.
6 Convention, supra note 1, at art. 20.
I d. at art. 25.




6 See Calkins, supra note 51, at 256-58.
Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 291, 294-
95 (1965).
69Id
70 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 507.
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known as the Hague Protocol.7" The response of American
politicians to the continued low liability limits, and to special
protection of the aviation industry in general, was so negative
that the President never transmitted the Hague Protocol to
the Senate for its approval.72
The controversy over the liability limitation reached a cli-
max when, in 1965, the United States formally denounced
the Convention.73 The denunciation was conditioned for six
months,74 however, upon an international agreement on a li-
ability limit of approximately $100,000 per passenger or an
interim agreement by a majority of international air carriers
which would waive the liability limit up to $75,000 per pas-
senger. 75 After the notice of denunciation was given, a diplo-
matic conference convened in Montreal. 76
At Montreal, Andreas Lowenfeld, the chairman of the
United States delegation, officially expressed the American
government's displeasure with the Convention.77 He stated
that the liability limitation was archaic 78 and that the advan-
tages provided by the Convention - the presumption of lia-
bility in the carrier, the placement of jurisdiction, and the
preclusion of further limitations on carrier liability 79 _ were
already provided under modern American jurisprudence.8 "
He strongly implied that the interests of the United States in
7 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, 478 U.N.T.S.
372 (1955) [hereinafter cited as the Hague Protocol]. The Hague Protocol, however,
also deleted the willful misconduct exception (See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25)
and replaced it with a higher standard of care that would have been almost impossible
to prove. Kreindler, supra note 68, at 295.
72 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 510, 516.
73 See Haskell, supra note 42 at 486-87.
11 The Convention provides that denunciation shall take effect six months after the
notification of denunciation. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 39.
75 US Gives Notice of Denunciation of Warsaw Convention, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923
(1965). The Convention provides for voluntary agreements by special contract be-
tween the carrier and passenger for liability in excess of that imposed by the Conven-
tion. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 22.
76 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 551.
" See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 580.
7a Id.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
-3 Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 583. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at
516-32, for an overview of the developments in American jurisprudence.
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maintaining international cooperation was the only benefit
being reaped under the Convention.8 '
Despite the fact that withdrawal by the United States
would have destroyed the system set up under the Conven-
tion,82 the diplomats at the Montreal conference failed to
reach any consensus on the appropriate liability limits.8 3
Before the denunciation became effective, however, the air
carriers themselves, fearful of unlimited liability, did agree to
an interim accord,84 the Montreal Agreement.85 The net ef-
fect of the Montreal Agreement was to create absolute liabil-
ity in the adhering airline for any death or injury of a
passenger and to establish a liability limit of $75,000.86 But
the Agreement did not amend the text of the Convention.
It was a voluntary agreement among the airlines that covered
only those flights which included a point of origin, destina-
tion, or an agreed stopping place in the United States.88 Al-
though the Agreement was intended to be temporary, it
remains in effect today.8 9
"I See Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 583. The position asserted by the American delega-
tion at the Montreal Conference received popular support in this country. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1965, at 30, col. 2 (city ed.) ("As we have previously said on this page,
we would prefer outright renunciation of the Warsaw Convention and rejection of the
[Hague] protocol because they are no longer needed by the airlines and have never
been in the interests of passengers."), quoted in Kreindler, supra note 68, at 291-92. But
cf. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting a certified copy of the Proloco, S. ExEc. Doc. No. H, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 22,
25 (1959) (Because of the uniform regime of law supplied by the Convention, "the
benefits accruing to the United States from the Warsaw Convention, as amended by
the Hague Protocol, would appear to outweigh the possible disadvantages to the
United States . . . .") quoted in Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 514-15.
R2 See Haskell, supra note 42, at 487; Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at
590.
'1 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 42, at 575.
- Id at 596.
a- CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AGREEMENT 18900, AGREEMENT RELATING TO LI-
ABILITY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL
(1966), approved 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) (CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ORDER No.
E-23680 (May 13, 1966)) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement].
- Haskell, supra note 42, at 488.
87 Id.
- Montreal Agreement, supra note 85, at art. i.
- In March of 1983, the Senate voted against ratification of the Montreal Protocols
3 and 4 which were the most recent attempts to amend the Warsaw Convention. The
Protocols would have increased the liabiltiy limit to approximately $109,000. The op-
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Aside from the principles underlying the Convention and
the more significant political developments affecting its sta-
tus, one line of judicial decisions merits some attention.
These cases, which focus on whether the Convention created
a right of action, are noteworthy because of a possible defense
facing a Bab* plaintiff - that the Convention creates an ex-
clusive right of action pre-empting all rights of action at state
law.' Since the Bali scenario is predicated upon attaining a
jury verdict at state law in excess of the liability limit im-
posed under the Convention and its progeny, the Montreal
Agreement, 9' an exclusive right of action under the Conven-
tion would circumvent any potential taking claim at its
inception.92
Whether a right of action exists under the Warsaw Con-
vention was first addressed by a United States Court of Ap-
peals in Noel v. Linea Aerospostal Venezolana.93 This suit arose
following the crash of a Venezulean airliner over the Atlantic
Ocean. The plaintiffs, executors of one of the passengers,
filed a civil suit in federal district court asserting a right of
ponents of the Protocols successfully argued that amendment of the Convention would
only prolong antiquation. See DeVivo, supra note 41, at 71-75.
-' This cc nment does not address whether the substitution of an exclusive federal
right of action under the Convention for a right of action at state law having no limita-
tions on carrier liability constitutes a taking of property without just compensation.
Nevertheless, that a taking may exist under such circumstances perhaps has some sup-
port in Justice Powell's dissenting statements in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1980) (Powell J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In response to the
majority's position that revocable attachments against foreign assets frozen by Execu-
tive Order were not property interests which could be taken, Justice Powell stated,
"there is a substantial question whether the [Executive] Orders themselves may have
effected a taking by making conditional the attachments that claimants against Iran
otherwise could have obtained without condition." Id at 690 n.l.
1, See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
92 An exclusive right of action under the Convention, a treaty, would fall within the
treaty exception to the jurisdiction of the claims court. See infta notes 117-157 and
accompanying text. Assuming exclusivity, a plaintiff's only viable challenge under the
taking clause would have to follow Justice Powell's remarks in Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1980). See supra note 90. The proper forum would be a federal
district court.
13 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957). A federal court first considered whether the Conven-
tion created a right of action in Choy v. Pan American Airways Co., I Av. Cas. (CCH)
946 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Choy held that the Convention does not create a right of action.
The court determined that a right of action could not exist without an enabling act
vesting ownership of the right of action. Id at 948-49.
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action under the Convention. 4 The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 95
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the Convention
did not create an independent right of action but created
only a presumption of liability.9 6 The appellate court did not
rely upon a literal interpretation of the language of the Con-
vention regarding carrier liability, 97 which states that "the
carrier shall be liable for damages sustained." 98 Rather, the
court interpreted the Convention in light of the report of the
Secretary of State that was transmitted to the Senate prior to
that body's ratification of the Convention. 99 This report, in
summary fashion, stated that the Convention presumed lia-
bility in the carrier, but the report did not address the exist-
ence or nonexistence of a right of action."0°
For over twenty years Noel remained good law."' Then in
Noel, 247 F.2d at 679. The plaintiffs also alleged an action under the Federal
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1976). 247 F.2d at 678. The court
held that an action under this act was cognizable only in admiralty. Id at 680.
* Id at 678.
Id. at 679. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3563 at 424-25 (1975) (discussing the jurisdictional statute of the federal
district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), as applied to a cause of action under the
Convention).
9, See Noel, 247 F.2d at 679.
- Article 17 of the Convention reads in its entirety:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17.
-* Noe, 247 F.2d at 679. See Letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to President
Roosevelt, reprinted in 1934 U.S. Av. R. 240, 243.
Id. The report states in relevant part:
The effect of article 17 (ch.III) of the Convention is to create a presump-
tion of liability against the aerial carrier on the mere happening of an
accident occasioning injury or death of a passenger subject to certain
defenses allowed under the Convention to the aerial carrier. The burden
is upon the carrier to show that the injury or death has not been the
result of negligence on the part of the carrier or his agents.
Id.
,o See, e.g., Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 519 ("[I]n all subsequent
American Warsaw cases [following Noe] it was either assumed or decided that the
claim must be founded on some law other than the Convention itself.").
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Benjamins v. British European Airways, 102 the Second Circuit
reappraised its position and held that a right of action did
exist under the Convention. °3 The court grounded its rever-
sal of Noelprimarily upon two considerations.10 4 First, it rec-
ognized that other common law signatories had adopted a
version of the Convention clearly indicating the existence of a
right of action.'05 Second, and more importantly, it noted
that the nonexistence of a right of action was inconsistent
with the intention of the drafters to create a uniform interna-
tional law.
°0 6
Carrying the significance which Benj'amins accorded uni-
formity to its logical extreme might seem to indicate that the
right of action recognized should be construed as exclusive.
Although the Benjamins majority never addressed exclusiv-
ity,0 7 the dissenting judge was quick to add that the right of
-0 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). The plaintiffs in
Benjamt'ns pleaded federal jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act and general
federal question jurisdiction arising under a treaty. Id at 915-16. Since the Alien Tort
Claims Act provided no basis for jurisdiction, the court addressed whether a right of
action under the Convention would provide a basis. Id. at 916.
,03 The decision reached in Benjamins was long advocated by eminent commentators.
See, e.g., Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 517 (remarking that an independ-
ent right of action seemed to follow from the structure of the Convention); Calkins, The
Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention pt. 1, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 217, 218 (1959)
(stating that the draftsmen intended to create a right of action based on the contract of
carriage).
Ironically, the same circuit judge authored the opinions in both Benjamins and Noel.
See Benjaminr, 572 F.2d at 914; Noel, 247 F.2d at 678.
-' Benj'amins, 572 F.2d at 919. The court concluded that an examination of the text
of the Convention proved inconclusive. Id at 919. But see Salamon v. Koninklijke
Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V., 107 N.Y.S.2d 768, 773 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ("If the Con-
vention did not create a cause of action in Art. 17, it is difficult to understand just what
Art. 17 did do."), af'dmem., 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953); Calkins, supra note 103 (deter-
mining after an extensive examination of the text of the Convention and the minutes of
the Conference at Warsaw that the drafters intended to achieve uniformity by a right
of action).
, Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 918-19. See Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw
Convention pt. 2, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 323, 324-25 (1959) (citing British, Canadian and
Australian legislation).
,- Benamins, 572 F.2d at 918-19.
0,7 See, e.g., Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, 107 N.Y.S.2d 768
(Sup. Ct. 1951), aj'dmem., 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953). The Salamon court concluded that
the Convention creates the exclusive right of action for damages suffered in that trans-
portation to which its terms apply. Id at 773. It explained:
The Convention obviously intended to integrate the rights and liabilities
of the passengers and carrier in connection with "international transpor-
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action recognized by the majority would not be exclusive."8
He read article 24, which states that any action, "however
founded," is subject to the conditions of the Convention,'0 9 as
establishing that no right of action derived from the Conven-
tion would be exclusive." 0 This interpretation has the sup-
port of other courts and commentators alike."' For example,
when the Ninth Circuit recently held that a right of action
exists under the Convention," 2 it noted that article 24 clearly
evidenced the drafters intention to make the action
nonexclusive. "3
The Second and Ninth Circuits now agree that a right of
action does exist under the Convention, and both have indi-
cated that the action is not exclusive."' The underlying as-
sumption in the Bali case, that an action under state law is
available to a victim of an international air disaster," 5 there-
fore, appears to rest on a solid foundation. The next hurdle,
then, in a Bali plaintiff's quest for just compensation is estab-
lishing jurisdiction in the claims court.
tation" as defined in the Convention, and "unify rules relating to inter-
national transportation by air" . . . . If the carrier, in addition to the
liability provided for in the Convention, could also be subjected to such
other liabilities as might exist under the laws of such state as might be
selected for instituting suit, the very purpose of the convention as ex-
pressed therein, namely, to regulate "in a uniform manner the condi-
tions of international transportation by air in respect of the. . . liability
of the carrier" would be defeated.
Id at 773-74.
- Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 922 n.6.
' See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 24.
Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 922 n.6.
See Calkins, supra note 103, at 225-26; infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
But see Kennelly, Response to Comments on Burdell v. Canadian Paqfr Airlines, 58 ILL. B.J.
454, 456 (1970) (stating that the Convention does not create a cause of action for
wrongful death but limits the already existing causes of action).
,, In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
Since diversity jurisdiction had not sufficiently been alleged in the district court, the
Ninth Circuit faced the issue of whether federal question jurisdiction was present by
virtue of a cause of action under the Convention. Id. at 404 & n.4.
"3 Id at 414 n.25.
"1 See supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text.
I" See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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III. JURISDICTION OF THE CLAIMS COURT
Although much of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Bah" con-
cerning the taking question was dicta, the court squarely held
that the United States Claims Court has jurisdiction to de-
cide whether the Convention effects a taking under the fifth
amendment." 6 Under the Bah scenario, however, the taking
claim would be filed in the claims court, not in a district
court in the Ninth Circuit." 7 Hence, certain issues material
to the jurisdiction of the claims court merit discussion.
Through the provisions of the Tucker Act," 8 the claims
court has jurisdiction over any claim against the United
States "founded upon . . .the Constitution.""' 9 In selecting
this particular language, Congress intended to explicitly pro-
vide a remedy for the taking of private property for public
use.' 20 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has construed the ju-
risdiction of the claims court over taking claims to be as com-
prehensive as the Constitution.' 2' The grant ofjurisdiction in
116 Bal, 684 F.2d at 1313. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34 for the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning. The holding of the Ninth Circuit in Ba/i regarding the jurisdic-
tional statute of the claims court would apparently have no binding effect on the
claims court, for the decisions of the claims court are appealable to the Federal Circuit,
not the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West Supp. 1984). In addition, the
United States would not be precluded from relitigating the issue of jurisdiction under
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because, among other reasons, it
was not a party to the action in the Bali case. See generally M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL
PROCEDURE 227-41 (2d ed. 1979).
' See supra text accompanying notes 36-41. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976), the
district courts have jurisdiction concurrent with the claims court over any claim
against the United States "founded ...upon the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(1976). The concurrent jurisdiction of the district courts, however, extends only to
claims not exceeding $10,000.
118 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified, as amended, in various sections of 28 U.S.C.). For
an overview of the statutory development of the jurisdiction of the claims court, see
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1326-27
(2d ed. 1973).
1,9 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 11 1978). The general grant of jurisdiction states in part:
"The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constituion or any Act of
Congress or any regulation of an executive department ... ." Id
1- Shea, StatutoqyJursdiction of the Court of Claus." Past, Present, and Future, 29 FED. B.J.
157, 158 (1970).
121 See Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940) (Hughes, C.J.) (stating
that for any action constituting a taking under the fifth amendment, the claims court
can entertain a suit for relie).
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the Tucker Act is not absolute, however, because any claim
"growing out of or dependent upon any treaty entered into
with foreign nations"'' 22 is excepted from the jurisdiction of
the claims court. 123
The extent of the jurisdictional limitation was an issue
under the scrutiny of the Supreme Court in the seminal opin-
ion of United States v. Weld.12 4 In Weld, Great Britain had
agreed, in the Treaty of Washington, 125 to pay the United
States Government approximately fifteen million dollars in
satisfaction of claims asserted by the Government. 26  Con-
gress then undertook to administer this fund to individual
claimants by specific acts of appropriation. 127 The claimants
in Weld sought to recover their full pro rata share of the ap-
propriation enacted by Congress. 128
The Court acknowledged that absent the Treaty of Wash-
ington there would have been no pool of funds to distribute
and consequently no act of appropriation.1 29  The Court
stated, however, that this relationship was too remote for the
claim in question to be "dependent upon" the treaty. 130 Ac-
cording to the Court, the relevant inquiry under the treaty
exception is whether the right asserted by the claimant de-
rives its "life and existence" from some provision of a
122 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
123 Id "Treaty" as used in section 1502 has been interpreted to encompass interna-
tional executive agreements as well as agreements submitted to the Senate for ratifica-
tion. The rationale behind this interpretation of "treaty" is the principle of separation
of powers underlying section 1502 and the avoidance of judicial interference with the
conduct of foreign relations. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889,
903 & n.17 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
121 127 U.S. 51 (1887).
,2. In the Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, Great Britain paid a gross sum of
$15,500,000 to the United States for satisfaction of all claims arising from the actions of
two Confederate warships, the Alabama and the Florida, during the Civil War. Great
Western Ins. Co. v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 206, 207, 217 (1884).
Great Britain had allowed the ships to be built and furnished within its territory.
Great Western Ins. Co. v. United States, 112 U.S. 193, 194-95 (1884).
126 Weld, 127 U.S. at 56.
,27 Id A Court of Commissioners actually fixed the amount and preference of
awards to the individual claimants. Id at 51-54.
,28 Id. at 56-57.
-9 Id at 57.
1 - Id
1984] COMMENTS 963
treaty.'3 1 The Court held that the claim was founded upon
the appropriations act, not the treaty, and therefore did not
fall within the treaty exception.
132
,,' Id Although the statute construed in Weldwas a predecessor of the Tucker Act,
the language was virtually the same. Compare Weld, 127 U.S. at 57 (quoting the statu-
tory language, 'dependent upon and grows out of) with 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976)
("growing out of or dependent upon").
' Weld, 127 U.S. at 56-57. The holding in Weldstates:
In our view of the case, the statute contemplates a direct and proximate
connection between the treaty and the claim, in order to bring such
claim within the class excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims. . . . In order to make the claim one arising out of a treaty
within the meaning of [the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1502], the nght
itself, which the petition makes to be the foundation of the claim, must
have its origin - derive its life and existence - from some treaty stipu-
lation. This ruling is analogous to that of the ancient and universal rule
relating to damages in common-law actions; namely, that a wrongdoer
shall be held responsible only for the proximate, and not for the remote,
consequences of his action.
Id at 57.
Five years after Weld, the Supreme Court by analogy provided a further clarification
of the treaty exception. It said: "As a case arises under the Constitution or laws of the
United States whenever its decision depends upon the correct construction of either,
[citations omitted], so a case arising from or growing out of a treaty is one involving
rights given or protected by a treaty." United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427, 468-
69 (1893). A case in which the treaty exception barred jurisdiction on facts similar to
those in Weld is Great Western Ins. Co. v. United States, 112 U.S. 193 (1884). The
litigation in Great Western also involved the Treaty of Washington. The right to recover
in that case was grounded in the treaty which created a pool of funds to be allocated
by act of Congress in satisfaction of American claims. The claimant's theory was that
the United States became a trustee for him for the amount of his loss. Id at 195.
Congress had never appropriated any of the funds to this claimant. Id. at 196-97. The
Court held that the claims were dependent on the treaty and without the jurisdiction
of the claims court. The Court reasoned that through the treaty the United States
government undertook an implied promise to pay the class of American claims against
Great Britain, and as a consequence, neither the pool of funds nor the implied obliga-
tions to pay existed except by virtue of the treaty's stipulation. Id. at 197-98.
Another example of the application of the treaty exception is Eastern Extention,
Austral-Asia & China Telegraph Co. v. United States, 231 U.S. 326 (1913). The
Court, per Justice Hughes, held that claims under a contract with the Spanish govern-
ment which had been assumed by treaty were excepted from the jurisdiction of the
claims court. The Court further elaborated upon the facts and circumstances falling
within the treaty exception by stating:
The words 'treaty stipulation' [citing Welal should not be so narrowly
interpreted as to permit the exercise ofjurisdiction where the claim arises
solely out of the treaty cessation. Whether the liability asserted is said to
result from an express provision of assumption contained in a treaty, or
is sought to be enforced as a necessary consequence of the cessation made
by a treaty, it is equally within the policy and spirit of the statute; and
the letter of the statute should not be otherwise construed. It is its evi-
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The relationship between the treaty exception and the fact
that a claim would not have arisen but for the existence of a
treaty has also appeared in claims court cases following
Weld.133 Perhaps the best example is Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States. 34  An executive agreement 35  between the
United States and Great Britain concerning a joint defense
satellite communications program formed the basis of the
treaty exception question in Hughes.'36 Under the original
agreement between the two countries, if, perchance, one gov-
ernment suffered liability for patent infringements resulting
from those activities actually delegated in the agreement to
the other, the other was to provide indemnity.137 In a supple-
mental agreement, the United States consented to Great Brit-
ain's use of several American patents in the performance of its
obligations under the joint program.138 Under the applicable
jurisdictional statute for the claims court, 39 this consent ren-
dered the United States vicariously amenable to suit for Brit-
ain's infringement of those patents. 4 °
The Hughes Company, the registered owner of the patents,
consequently filed suit against the United States in the claims
court alleging that the British had infringed upon its patent
rights.' 4 ' The government maintained that the court lacked
jurisdiction under the treaty exeption.' 42 In deciding that ju-
risdiction existed, the Hughes court pointed out that the treaty
exception had very limited effect. 43 It read Weld to require
dent purpose that the obligations of the United States directly resulting
from a treaty should not be determined by the Court of Claims.
Id. at 333.
11 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976); So-
ciete Anonyme des Ateliers Brillie Freres v. United States, 160 Ct. Cl. 192 (1963).
534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
, International executive agreements are accorded treaty status. See supra note 123.
Hughes, 534 F.2d at 892.
'31 Id. at 894, 905-06.
- Id at 900.
,19 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1976). See infta note 152 for a treatment of the provisions of
this statute.
- Hughes, 534 F.2d at 897-902. See infra note 152 and text accompanying notes 150-
153 for an explanation of the United States' motives in giving this consent.
"4 Hughes, 534 F.2d at 892-97.
142 Id. at 897.
4. Id. at 903.
1984] COMMENTS 965
that the claim exist solely because of the express terms of the
treaty. 44 Hence, the court saw the test for the applicability
of the treaty exception to be whether the plaintiffs claim
could conceivably exist independently of the treaty or, on the
contrary, whether its existence was derived exclusively from
the terms of the treaty.14
5
The court interpreted the original executive agreement as
being merely a reciprocal indemnity agreement and not one
creating a private remedy.'46 Moreover, it indicated that
when the agreement was viewed from the vantage point of
the petition, it became clear that the agreement contained no
promises running to the plaintiff.147 The claims court deter-
mined that the fact that both executive agreements provided
only a "backdrop"'"4 to the claims for patent infringement
was not a sufficient nexus to come within the purview of the
treaty exception.14
9
The jurisdictional question in Hughes provides a good anal-
ogy for the jurisdictional issues facing a Bah" plaintiff in the
" Id at 904.
' Id at 903.
," Id at 906.
14, Id
1" The court in Hughes relied heavily on its previous holding in Societe Anonyme Des
At/iers Brilie Freres v. United States, 160 Ct. Cl. 192 (1963). In Societe Anonyme the plain-
tiff, a French corporation, had placed funds representing royalties due the United
States in an escrow account, pending determination of whether the amount was actu-
ally due from the French Government under an American-French executive agree-
ment (the Byrnes-Blum Agreement). After several years without any determination,
the plaintiff sued for the return of the funds. Id. at 195-96. The claims court held that
the treaty exception did not apply:
The Byrnes-Blum Agreement has not been drawn into consideration in
this case in the manner anticipated by the Supreme Court in the Old
Settlers case, [148 U.S. 427 (1893), discussed supra note 132]. We agree that
there is a connection between the Agreement and the suspense account
which has been presented to us for construction. Indeed, this case would
never have arisen were it not for the existence of the Byrnes-Blum Agree-
ment, because it is that very Agreement that motivated the parties to
establish the "escrow" account around which this dispute is centered.
Yet that is a far cry from finding that the claim before us 'derives its life
and existence' from some treaty stipulation, as the Wedcase, [127 U.S.
51 (1887), discussed supra notes 124-132 and accompanying text], would
require. Instead, the substance of plaintiff's claim is derived from the
original patent license contract.
Id. at 197.
149 See Hughes, 534 F.2d at 906.
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claims court. The statute conferring patent infringement ju-
risdiction on the claims court requires that such infringement
be for the "use" of the United States.150 The statute further
provides that authorization or consent by the government
shall be construed as being for the "use" of the govern-
ment. 15' The jurisdiction of the claims court in Hughes, there-
fore, was entirely dependent upon the supplemental consent
agreement between the United States and Great Britain. 5 '
But as the holding in Hughes indicates, the claims were in sub-
stance for patent infringement and did not "arise out" of the
executive agreements. 53
A Bali plaintiffs claim is grounded in the taking clause of
the fifth amendment to the Constitution. 54  While no such
claim could have arisen but for the liability limitations of the
Convention, the treaty exception has been construed to re-
quire a more direct causal connection. 5 5 Simply applying
the test from Weld 56 reveals that the claim of a taking under
the Convention does not "derive its life and existence" from
the Convention itself. No stipulation in the treaty grants the
right to sue the government when it takes private property
for a public use; plaintiffs derive this right from the Constitu-
tion. Moreover, the causal connection between the Conven-
tion and the taking claim is no less proximate than that of the
executive agreements in Hughes and the resulting right to sue
the United States vicariously in the claims court for patent
- 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1976).
1.51 Id
152 See Hughes, 534 F.2d at 900-01. The consent agreement between the United
States and Great Britain was deliberately designed to bring any patent infringement
by the British under the jurisdiction of the claims court. Id The claims court has
exclusive jurisdiction over any patent infringement by the Government. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 (1976). By consenting to patent infringement by the British, the United States
invoked the exclusive jurisiction of the claims court and thus prevented the Hughes
Company from seeking an injunction against the British in federal district court. Both
governments realized that an injunction, if granted, would have caused much delay in
the joint defense project. See Hughes, 534 F.2d at 900-02. In addition, the reciprocal
indemnity clause in the original agreement protected the United States from bearing
the ultimate burden of liability. See supra text accompanying note 137.
- Hughes, 534 F.2d at 906.
.4 See supra note 7.
' See, e.g., supra note 148.
' See supra note 132.
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infringement.157 In short, a Bah'plaintiff should encounter no
great difficulty in establishing the jurisdiction of the claims
court.
The path delineated by the Ninth Circuit in Bah" has thus
far proven true. The authorities support the ability of a
plaintiff to bring a wrongful death action under state law"'
and to establish the jurisdiction of the claims court. 59 The
true bone of contention lies in those issues relating to a taking
under the fifth amendment.
IV. "TAKING" WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION UNDER
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Our founding fathers drafted the taking clause of the fifth
amendment in laconic terms, providing no specific guidance
as to those instances to which it was intended to apply. The
taking clause merely states, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." 60 The pur-
pose of the fifth amendment, according to the Supreme
Court, is to prevent the Government from forcing individuals
to bear public burdens which, as a matter of fairness, should
be borne by the public as a whole. 16' The Court has, how-
ever, established no precise rule to determine when property
has been taken 162 but has instead chosen to weigh the public
and private interests presented in the facts of each case. 163
Commentators, unable to identify the principle upon which
the disparate taking cases may be reconciled, have ridiculed
the inconsistency in the Supreme Court decisions on this is-
1.1 See supra notes 134-153 and accompanying text.
- See supra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
,.9 See supra notes 116-157 and accompanying text.
60 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra note 7 for the fifth amendment set forth in its
entirety. Although the fifth amendment only applies to the federal government, the
taking clause was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Chicago
B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
161 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
.62 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 156
(1952).
163 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260-61 (1980).
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sue. 16 4  Nonetheless, the fifth amendment clearly requires
that a private property interest must exist and that this prop-
erty interest must be "taken" before just compensation is
due. 165
A. Property Interest
The great majority of the taking cases presents no issue as
to the existence of a property interest because the regulation
asserted as violating the fifth amendment is imposed on
land. 166 Bah'plaintiffs must argue, however, that the Conven-
tion limits recovery on a wrongful death action under state
law, and thus a taking occurs, not of real property, but of a
portion of a cause of action.167 Somewhat similar claims in a
variety of contexts have been regarded as compensable prop-
erty interests.
' E.g., Donaldson, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land- The Need to Purge Natural
Law Cnstraintsfrom the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187, 194 n.48
(1974) ("[I]f the utility of legal rules in a jurisprudential system can be judged by their
predictability, the rules employed to determine where the regulation of land use ends
and taking of property begins are useless."); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Per-
spective. Thi'rty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 63 ("a crazy-
quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine on the law of expropriation"); Humbach, A
Uniyjing Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases. Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34
RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 244 (1982) ("[T]he present state of of the law is somewhat
illogical . . . . [Tihe law of police power takings is a widely acknowledged
hodgepodge, its doctrines a farrago of fumblings which have suffered too long from a
surfeit of deficient theories."); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37, 46
(1946) ("The predominate characteristic of this area of the law is a welter of confusing
and apparently incompatible results . . . . [Tihe [Supreme] Court has settled upon no
satisfactory rationale for the cases and operates somewhat haphazardly, using any or
all of the available, often conflicting theories without developing any clear approach to
the constitutional problem."); Stoebuck, Polce Power, Takings andDue Process, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1057, 1059 n. 1t (1980) ("In truth, the collected decisions of the
Supreme Court, and all other courts, leave the subject as disheveled as a ragpicker's
coat."); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Polce Power. The Search for Inverse Condemna-
tion Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) ("With some exceptions, the decisional law
is largely characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained in con-
clusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric. Even the modicum of
predictability which might otherwise inhere in the pattern of judicial precedents is
impaired by the frequently reiterated judicial declaration that each case must be de-
cided on its own facts.").
"-, See J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480 (2d ed.
1982).
1..; Van Alstyne, supra note 164, at 4 n.15.
"1; See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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Claims arising in two claims court decisions rendered in
the 1800's provide the closest analogy to the claims asserted
by a Bali plaintiff. 68 In Meade v. United States,"'69 the alleged
property interest was the claims of an American merchant,
Meade, against Spain. 70 Meade founded the claims on con-
tracts for supplies that he had sold to the Spanish govern-
ment.17 ' A Royal Commission had verified the authenticity
and amount of the claims, and the King of Spain had ac-
knowledged them, making them conclusive against the Span-
ish government. 7 2 Spain, however, subsequently ratified a
treaty with the United States' 73 which released Spain from
all claims of American citizens and shifted the liability for
those claims to the United States. The treaty also established
an American tribunal to evaluate the validity of the claims
against Spain and to provide recovery accordingly.' 74
This tribunal refused to receive Meade's Spanish decree of
liquidation as evidence of a valid claim and denied Meade
- See Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886); Meade v. United States, 2 Ct.
Cl. 224 (1866).
,9 2 Ct. Cl. 224 (1866).
,70 Id at 253.
M' Id Contracts are granted special immunity from legislative acts of the states
under the Constitution. Article I denies to the states the power to pass any law "im-
pairing the obligations of contracts." See U.S. CONST. art. I § 10. By its terms this
section does not apply to the acts of the federal government. Neither does it impair
even the state's power to "take" a contract. See Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 223 U.S. 390 (1912) where the Supreme Court distinguished the contract clause
and the taking clause in these terms:
The constitutional inhibition upon any state law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts is not a limitation upon the power of eminent domain.
The obligation of a contract is not impaired when it is appropriated to a
public use and compensation made therefore. Such an exertion of power
neither challenges its validity nor impairs its obligation. Both are recog-
nized, for it is appropriated as an existing enforceable contract. It is a
taking, not an impairment of its obligation. If compensation be made,
no constitutional right is violated.
223 U.S. at 400. Contract rights as compensable property interests, therefore, can be
analogized to other choses in action for the purpose of a taking question despite the
fact that in certain instances contract rights are accorded a unique status under the
Constitution.
172 Id at 257.
,7. Id at 254, 273.
174 Id at 254.
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any compensation.'75 Meade then brought an action in the
claims court, alleging that the United States Government's
actions constituted a taking compensable under the fifth
amendment. 76 To Meade's misfortune, the claims court rec-
ognized that jurisdiction over his claim lay exclusively with
the tribunal created under the treaty.'77 Nevertheless, the
court expressed its opinion that there would have been a tak-
ing without just compensation had jurisdiction in the claims
court existed.' 78 On the issue of the existence of property in-
terest, the court interjected that one's choses in action are "as
much property and as sacred in the eye of the law as are his
houses and lands, his horses and his cattle.' 79
In accord is Gray v. United States, 80 an advisory opinion, 8 '
arising out of the seizure of American merchant vessels by the
French revolutionary government prior to 1801.82 The valid-
ity of the claims of those merchants suffering loss during this
period was admitted by the French Government.'8 3 The
United States thereafter surrendered the individual claims in
the Treaty of 1800 in return for a cessation of hostilities be-
tween the two countries.'84 Addressing whether a property
interest existed, the claims court stated:
We do not say that for all purposes these claims were 'prop-
erty' in the ordinarily accepted and in the legal sense of the
word; but they were rights which had a value, a value incho-
ate, to be sure, and entirely dependent upon adoption and
enforcement by the Government; but an actual money value
,1. The original documents establishing Meade's claims were submitted to the Span-
ish government as proof of his claims and never returned. Id at 256.




- 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1866).
, An advisory opinion is an interpretation of the law without binding effect.
BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 50 (5th ed. 1979). Congress had given the claims court the
authority to rule on the liability of the United States with the proviso that the decision
would not be binding upon the United States. Gray, 21 Ct. Cl. at 343-46.
,82 21 Ct. Cl. at 343.
I'7 Id
"7 Id at 392.
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capable of ascertainment ....- 85
While the Supreme Court has never addressed the exist-
ence of a property interest in rights of action abrogated by a
treaty, it faced the limitation of such rights by domestic legis-
lation in Armstrong v. United States.18 6 The claimants in Arm-
strong asserted materialmen's liens for the value of materials
incorporated into several boats being constructed for the
United States Navy. 87 On default of the primary contractor,
title to the unfinished hulls was transferred to the government
in accordance with the terms of the government construction
contract.'88 The government was immune from liability on
the materialmen's liens.'8 9 Consequently, the claimants as-
serted that the government had effectively destroyed their
liens by receiving transfer of title from the contractor.t9° The
Court held that compensable property interests existed in the
liens.'9 It pointed out that Maine law entitled materialmen
to resort to specific property in satisfaction of their claims and
that the government's acceptance of title to the hulls pre-
cluded the plaintiff's exercise of this right, thus taking the
claimants' property in the liens.192
Similarly, in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 93 an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act limited a mortgagee's
rights in a mortgage. '9 Under the act, as amended, the
mortgagee in effect had to surrender his lien for the fair mar-
8- Id at 393. The claims court also elaborated upon the liability of the United
States under the fifth amendment, adding:
It seems to us that this 'bargain'. . . by which the present peace and
quiet of the United States, as well as their future prosperity and great-
ness were largely secured, and which was brought about by the sacrifice
of the interests of individual citizens, falls within the intent and meaning
of the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation.
Id
,8 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
87 Id at 41.
88Id
M9 Id at 43.
'8 Id at 41-42.
Id at 44.
192 Id
'93 295 U.S. 555 (1934).
1- Id. at 575-76.
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ket value of the mortgaged property. 195 Kentucky law, how-
ever, protected the rights of a mortgagee to release a lien only
upon full payment of the indebtedness.' 96 In an opinion by
Justice Brandeis, the Court held that a valuable property in-
terest had been taken without just compensation. ' 97
While the rights held compensable in the foregoing cases
provide an analogy to those claims asserted by a Bab* plain-
tiff, the Supreme Court has not specifically considered
whether a wrongful death action constitutes a compensable
property interest. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, has indi-
cated, as did the claims court in Meade98 and Gray,'99 that
"property" within the contemplation of the fifth amendment
includes intangibles such as choses in action. °° In addition,
the Court has stated that "property" will normally be defined
by reference to local law.2° t Whether rights of action in tort
are considered as property rights under state law, therefore,
becomes material.
'- Id at 576, 579.
'" Id at 590.
,97 Id at 601-02. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), also provides au-
thority for the existence of a compensable property interest in liens and attachments.
Justice Powell remarked in dissent that "it is settled" that an attachment entitling a
creditor to levy on specific property for satisfaction of a claim is property under the
fifth amendment. Id at 690 n.1. The majority held that the taking question in that
case was not ripe for review. Id at 688-89.
The extent to which Louisville Bank may be read as authority on the issue of a "tak-
ing" itself or for a statement upon the constitutionality of the provisions found in mod-
ern bankruptcy legislation has been vehemently attacked by the Third Circuit in In re
Ashe, 669 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1982). The court stated in Ashe that Louisville Bank had
been decided upon substantive due process principles rather than under the takings
clause. Id at 110. But see Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193, 1197-98
(10th Cir. 1981) (commenting that Louzville Bank continues to be cited not only by the
Supreme Court in taking cases but by Congress as well in Congressional Reports deal-
ing with bankruptcy legislation).
2 Ct. Cl. 224, discussedsupra notes 169-179 and accompanying text.
"" 21 Ct. Cl. 340, dtscussedsupra notes 180-185 and accompanying text.
See Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1911).
'Al See United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 166, 279 (1943).
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In California, the state in which the Bah case was tried, the
Civil Code defines rights created by statute as property.2"2
The California Court of Appeals has held that the right to
compensation for personal injuries inflicted through another's
negligence is a property interest recognized and protected
under California law.2 °3 Likewise, the same court has recog-
nized that the right to recover damages in tort is a chose in
action and, as such, is property protected from deprivation by
the legal process.20 4
Although a right of action in tort may be generally re-
garded as a property interest under state law, the very fact
that the "property" in question is the right to compensation
in excess of the Convention's liability limitation raises an-
other specter to haunt the Bab* plaintiff. Statutes limiting lia-
bility to various monetary sums have been prevalent in
American jurisdictions for many years. 2 5 These statutes have
taken the form of automobile guest statutes, workmen's com-
pensation and charitable immunity laws, and federal liability
' California defines property as follows:
PROPERTY, WHAT. The ownership of a thing is the right of one or
more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this
Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property.
IN WHAT PROPERTY MAY EXIST. There may be ownership of
all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation or of manual
delivery; of all domestic animals; of all obligations; of such products of
labor or skill as the composition of an author, the good-will of a business,
trade-marks and signs, and of rights created or granted by statute.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 654, 655 (West 1982). In regard to rights of action the Code is
even more specific. One section of the Code states: " 'Personal property' includes
money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt." CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 180 (West 1966). Another portion of the Code adds: "A thing in action is a right to
recover money or other personal property by a judicial proceeding." CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 953 (West 1982).
-. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678, 679-80, hearing deniedper
curiam, 93 P.2d 562 (Cal. 1939). The question was presented in the context of an al-
leged act of malpractice in the delivery of a child. Id at 679.
" Carver v. Ferguson, 254 P.2d 44, 45-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
-5 See Haskell, supra note 42 at 505-10. The author gives a general overview of vari-
ous liability limitation schemes in both the federal and state contexts while arguing by
analogy for the constitutionality of the Convention under the due process clause. He
failed, however, to consider the implications of the Convention's liability limitations
under the taking clause of the fifth amendment. Id
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limits in admiralty and maritime matters."' 6 But the Ninth
Circuit in Bah saw such limitations on liability as changes in
the law that were imposed by the same sovereign entity that
created both the right and the remedy.20 7 The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the liability limitations under the Convention
as limitations imposed by an independent body of federal law
on rights of action under state law.208 The Ninth Circuit
seemed to assume that Congress was not on an equal plane
with the states when altering property rights extant under
state law through the otherwise valid exercise of the powers
granted it under the Constitution.20 9 Upon close examina-
z - Id
21"1 See Bali, 684 F.2d at 1312 n.10.
'28Id
" See Bali, 684 F.2d at 1312 n.10. The court stated:
[F]urthermore, we are not dealing here with a change in a rule of the
common law. Plaintiffs are not complaining of a change in law, but of
the limitation of an independently existing right under state law ....
The source of property rights is necessarily common law or statute, usu-
ally state statute.
Id The apparent position of the Ninth Circuit, i.e., that the circumscription of "prop-
erty" is exclusively within the province of the states, is not without support. Property
interests are not created by the Constitution; rather, "they are created and their
dimensions defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law .... " Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
The Supreme Court has also stated in dicta: "[n]or as a general proposition is the
United States, as opposed to the several states, possessed of residual authority that
enables it to define 'property' in the first instance." Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1979). This broad statement in the majority opinion in
Pruneyard, however, drew concurrences from Justices Blackmun and Marshall, who spe-
cifically disagreed with the statement. Id. at 88, 93. That the alteration of "property"
rights is without the power of the federal government is also at odds with United States
v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943), where the Court stated: "Though the meaning
of'property' as used. . . in the Fifth Amendment is a federal question, it will normally
obtain its content by reference to local law." The cases following Powelson have looked
to federal law to determine whether a property interest exists in those instances where
applicable state law is confused or nonexistent. See Annot., I A.L.R. FED. 479, 481,
485-87 (1969). Moreover, following Pruneyard, the Court has looked to federal law to
determine the content of "property" within the meaning of the fifth amendment where
the federal law was more protective. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 162-165 (1980), discussedz)n Humbach, supra note 164, at 248 n.3, 285 n.213.
See also Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938) ("If the argument is
that Congress has no power to alter property rights, because the regulation of rights in
property is a matter reserved to the states, it is futile").
Given that a purported right under state law is "property" worthy of constitutional
protection, the Supreme Court decisions simply do not support the position that a
valid act of the federal legislature (an act within the powers enumerated in the Consti-
1984] COMMENTS 975
tion, however, the weight of authority does not support the
Ninth Circuit's assumption.
In fact, as illustrated in Second Employers' Li'abiz'ty Cases,21 °
the acts of Congress are without question supreme over the
laws of the states.21  The Second Employers' Liabilty Cases in-
volved a constitutional challenge to legislation regulating the
liability between railroads engaged in interstate commerce
and their employees.21 2 In this legislation, Congress had
abolished several rules under state law, including the fellow-
servant rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk,
which, in effect, had limited a master's liability to his ser-
vants. 213  The plaintiff attacked the legislation as being be-
yond the power of Congress and in contravention of the
liberty of contract under the fifth amendment. 2 4 The Court
flatly rejected the challenges. 21 5 It reiterated the oft-quoted
tution), which limits or extinguishes rights under state law, is assessed any differently
than an act of the state legislature. See infra notes 222-232 and accompanying text.
The constitutional power of federal courts to alter rights under the state law, however,
presents a much different question. The courts, as the final arbiters, are ultimately the
organ of the federal government to define the content of "property" within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment. SeeCooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"). Nevertheless, it
is the courts, not the legislature, whose power to create and extinguish private rights is
circumscribed. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 79-80 (1938). Where
an act of Congress is within the powers delegated in the Constitution, as is the case
with the Convention, then any admonition against a federal "definition" of "property"
may be more properly directed toward the judiciary than toward the legislature. The
remarks of one commentator are especially appropriate on this point:
To be sure, the constitutional meaning of the word property would not
have to be defined in terms of substantive law, generally state law, that
give force to the legal interests usually .comprehended by property. But
if the correspondence is not close, the just-compensation clause becomes,
in practice, a kind of never-never land anomaly, detached from the tex-
ture and policy of the rest of the law.
Humbach, supra note 164, at 247-48 (footnotes omitted). The suggestion in Roth that
"property" must be defined by the "existing rules or understandings ... such as state
law" could be read as another expression of the axiom that courts must look to the
traditional rights under statutory or common law in order to ensure that the amend-
ment does not become an "anomaly" amid a plethora ofjudicial legislation. Seegener-
aly Humbach, supra note 164 at 246-48.
21, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 2.
2 223 U.S. at 6-10, 46.
Id at 49.
"' Id
2. Id. at 52.
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words of Chief Justice Waite, who said:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the
common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law,
and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of property
which have been created by the common law cannot be taken
away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of con-
duct, may be changed at the will . . . of the legislature, unless
prevented by constitutional limitations.21 6
Having found that Congress had the power to abrogate the
common law of the state, the Court held that the fifth
amendment was not contravened 2 7 and added emphatically
that the congressional act superceded the laws of the states
which "[c]over the same field. ' 218
Although Congress certainly may override contrary state
law by domestic legislation or treaty,21 9 to focus solely upon
-; Id. at 50 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
17 Id at 52.
-, Id at 53-54 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 473 (1887); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 405-06 (1819)).
Once again, however, there is some support for the distinction drawn by the Ba/i
court between the delimitation of state created rights by the state and by the federal
government. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has
pointed out that when state law creates a cause of action, the state has an interest in
fashioning its own rules of tort law (by invocation of defenses or other limitation) that
is "paramount to any discernable federal interest." Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 282 (1980). The Court has further stated that when federal law is the source of a
right of action, there is a federal interest in defining the defenses to that claim which is
not present in a claim arising under state law. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 198
n.13 (1979).
But the Court has also noted that governmental regulation, by definition, involves
the adjustment of private rights. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). When
addressing a related issue the Court has said: "When Congress, in the exertion of the
power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people
and all the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the
policy of [the state] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature .... " Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). See also Block v. Compagnie Nation-
ale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801, 809-812 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (stating that state policy
against contractual limitations on liability is overridden by federal policy as expressed
in the Warsaw Convention), a~fd, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967); Kelly v. Societe
Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne, 242 F. Supp. 129, 145
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (stating that the "Law of the Land" must be applied notwithstanding
contrary state laws). The Ninth Circuit in Bah also recognized the ability of federal
law to override state law when it reversed the trial court on appeal. See supra notes 8-28
and accompanying text.
21 See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445, 4454 n.6
(April 17, 1984) (Steven J., dissenting) ("Congress naturally could repudiate the Con-
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the supremacy of congressional acts is to ignore the proper
inquiry under the taking clause."' Chief Justice Waite, for
example, contrasted "[r]ights of property" with the law "as a
rule of conduct."' 22' The ultimate question facing a Bak'
plaintiff, then, is when does a right created under a rule of
law become "property" within the meaning of the fifth
amendment?
The answer, simply put, is when the right becomes
"vested. 2 22 Rights under a law giving rise to tort liability
vest when the cause of action accrues.223 The distinction be-
tween protected, vested rights and nonprotected, nonvested
rights lies in the Court's perception of the institution of prop-
erty. The Court has stated that the purpose of recognized
property interests, in part, is to protect those claims on which
vention and set its own liability limitation through domestic legislation, but has not
done so").
-1 See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (stat-
ing that a (state) legislative body "by iose dirxi, may not transform private property
into public property without compensation .... This is the very kind of thing that
the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent."); Hughes v. Wash-
ington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[A] State cannot be permitted
to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of
law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never
existed at all.").
'1' See supra text accompanying note 216.
222 See Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 155 (1913); Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441
F.2d 1239, 1242 (5th Cir. 1971).
' Pitts v. Unarco Industries, 712 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509
(1983); Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. Il1. 1936).
A court might possibly view the liability limitation of the Convention as affecting a
plaintiff's "remedy" rather than his "right." The Supreme Court has deftly contrasted
"rights" and "remedies" in these words:
Statutes concerning remedies are such as relate to the course and mode
of procedure to enforce or defend a substantive right. Matters which
belong to the remedy are subject to change and alteration, and even
repeal, provided the legislation does not operate to impair a contract or
deprive one of a vested property right. If the changing or repealing stat-
ute leaves the parties a substantial remedy, the legislature does not ex-
ceed its authority. Rights and remedies shade one into the other so that
it is sometimes difficult to say that a particular act creates a right or
merely gives a remedy. So also a statute, under the form of taking away
or changing a particular remedy, may take away an existing property
right, or impair the obligation of a contract.
Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 155 (1913). Whether the Convention would be
viewed as affecting the "remedy" rather than the "right" is another question whose
answer is uncertain.
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people ordinarily rely in their "daily lives. "224 Hence, the
Court has concluded that certain interests are not "suffi-
ciently bound up with reasonable expectations. . . to consti-
tute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes. ' 225  For
instance, where workmen's compensation laws abolish private
rights of action, the Court has held that prospective abolition
of such rights is not inconsistent with the Constitution.226
The legislature may freely alter rights of action because all
parties are put on notice of any changes and may structure
their activities accordingly.
227
As the Senate ratified the Convention in 1934,228 all poten-
tial claims for compensation would most certainly have arisen
since its adoption. No viable right of action, therefore, could
possibly have vested prior to the change in the law. In addi-
tion, the reasonableness of "expectations" of full recovery in
an international air disaster is made less likely by the Con-
vention's stringent requirements of notice of the liability
limitation.229
The ability of a Bah" plaintiff to prove that the Conven-
tion's liability limitation is a taking without just compensa-
tion may depend in large part upon his ability to persuade
the claims court that he indeed possesses a property interest
in a right of action at state law. As the foregoing discussion
'2 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
22 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (citing
several examples). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979)
(stating that representations by government officials could lead to expectancies embod-
ied in the concept of "property" through estoppel); Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
294 U.S. 240, 303-05 (1935) (holding that a particular form of money is not private
property which may be taken); Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1918)
(holding that the state retains the power to revoke any right granted a corporation in
its charter).
' Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1917). It is ques-
tionable, however, whether a legislature could abolish all rights of action without vio-
lating the due process clause of the Constitution. See New York Central R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 &
n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
- See Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 84 N.J.L. 85, 86 A. 451, 456-57 (1913) (hold-
ing that contracts made after the passage of an elective workmen's compensation act
but before its effective date are subject to the act in that no property existed in the
prior state of the law).
22 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
2- See DeVivo, supra note 41, at 83-91.
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indicates,23° this task will not be easy. Yet the Ninth Circuit
made one additional observation in Ba/i that may aid a
plaintiff's quest for full and fair compensation. The court ob-
served that the cases commonly cited for the proposition that
a person has no "property" in the common law dealt with
statutes creating, not extinguishing, liability.2 3' Though the
case law does not explicitly support the distinction noted by
the court in Ba/i (perhaps because this issue has apparently
never been advanced before the Court), it should certainly be
pursued by a Bah plaintiff. Under a principled analysis of
the fifth amendment, however, the efficacy of such a conten-
tion is questionable.232
B. Determznation of a Taking
Assuming that the claims court can be persuaded that a
wrongful death action at state law does represent a compen-
sable property interest, the Bah plaintiff must next prove that
the liability limitation under the Convention "takes" this
property interest. The Supreme Court has drawn no bright
line to identify the point where regulation becomes a tak-
ing.2 33 Whenever faced with a taking question, the Court en-
gages in essentially ad hoc factual inquiries,234  for it
admittedly resolves each case as much with the exercise of
judgment as with the application of logic.2 35 In an effort to
clarify those formulae on which taking cases have been de-
cided, however, the Court has identified two tests that are of
particular significance to the case presented by a Bah plain-
tiff.2 36 These tests are: 1) the economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant (the diminution in value theory), and
2) whether the government acted in its enterprise or arbital
capacity (the enterprise-arbital theory).2 37
See supra notes 205-229 and accompanying text.
- Bali, 684 F.2d at 1312 n.10.
112 See supra notes 210-229 and accompanying text.
2 v, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 31, 65 (1979).
2.. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
2:' Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65.
2:1i Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-28.
217 Id. The Court in Penn Centralactually noted two other tests which are not appli-
cable to the claims presented under the Baiscenario. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125-
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1. Diminution in Value Theory
The diminution in value theory, perhaps the most popular
approach to the taking problem,2 38 has its genesis in Justice
Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.2 39 In 1921,
the Pennsylvania legislature had forbidden coal mining that
would cause the subsidence of any structure.24 ° Mahon con-
sequently sought to enjoin Pennsylvania Coal from mining
near his residence. 24 ' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted an injuction.242 The company appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, contending that the legislation
was a taking without just compensation of its right to mine
the coal.243
In Justice Holmes' view, the taking issue was determinable
by the extent of diminution in value of the asserted property
interest, a question depending upon the facts in each case.244
In applying this test, Justice Holmes specifically noted that
the coal company's sole interest in the property subject to the
legislation was the right to mine coal from the premises.245
Since Pennsylvania Coal's loss was complete, Justice Holmes
was persuaded that a taking had occurred.246 He concluded
that, as a general rule, "while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
27. One test, known as the noxious-use test, states that a regulation on land is not a
taking if it controls some noxious use the owner is making of the land. See Stoebuck,
supra note 164, at 1061. The other test is the so-called physical invasion test. See
Stoebuck, supra note 164, at 1070-72. The invasion test is best expressed in a recent
Supreme Court decision which held that when the character of governmental action is
a permanent physical occupation of property, a taking will be found to the extent of
the occupation whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982).
2M See Sax, supra note 164, at 50; Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 175-76 (1974).
TOn 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
210 Id. at 412-13.
'24, Id at 412.
242 Id
243 Id.
2,4 Id at 413.
'2r, Id at 412-13; See Michaelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1230 (1967).
246 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
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as a taking. "247
Exactly what Holmes meant by "too far" has never been
answered.248 Some commentators believe compensation is
due when the loss is at two-thirds of value.249 Some have
been unable to determine precisely when a taking occurs.25°
The Supreme Court has denied compensation for losses of
75% and 87% in value.251 When the Supreme Court has
found the fifth amendment violated under this theory, it has
done so only when the government's action completely de-
stroyed the asserted property interest.252
The outcome is open to conjecture when the diminution in
value theory is applied to the Convention's limitation as im-
posed upon a right of action under state law. Since the Court
has failed to adopt any exact percentage of value loss at
which a taking occurs,253 the amount of a jury verdict is not
likely to be determinative. Instead, the utilitarian nature of
the theory itself will likely dictate the outcome. One com-
mentator has characterized this theory as, in effect, allowing
courts to invoke the taking clause to compensate those plain-
tiffs who show themselves victims of unprincipled exploita-
tion and who present a strong subjective need for
compensation. 254
Ba/i plaintiffs, perhaps more than any other class present-
ing taking claims, can show that they are victims of forces
beyond their control. In addition, their intangible rights to
full compensation were effectively destroyed by the liability
limitation; their loss is distinguishable from regulation upon
real property which may merely prohibit the most beneficial
",,, Id at 415.
- Stoebuck, supra note 164, at 1064.
See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 208 (1973).
'" See, e.g., Sax, Takings, Private Property and Pub/ic Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 156
(1971); Michaelman, supra note 245, at 1233.
251 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
252 See Michaelman, supra note 245, at 1233; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127-28
(noting the complete destruction of property interests where taking was recognized
under this test).
2r,:1 Stoebuck, supra note 164, at 1065.
25 See Michaelman, sapra note 245, at 1229-30.
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use. A sense of justice, which the diminution in value theory
provides,255 favors recovery in a Bali plaintiff's case.
2. Enterpr'se-Arbilal Theory
The Supreme Court has also indicated that a taking ques-
tion might be resolved by an examination of whether the gov-
ernmental actions acquired resources for facilitating uniquely
public functions. 56 Professor Joseph Sax was the first to sug-
gest resolution of taking questions by analyzing whether gov-
ernmental actions benefitted the government as an enterprise
or only involved the mediation of competing private inter-
ests.257 Professor Sax predicated his theory upon what he per-
ceived to be the historical basis of the taking clause of the
fifth amendment.2 5' Based on a review of the early commen-
taries on the taking clause, he stated that its purpose was to
constrain the government's otherwise uncontrollable power
to appropriate the citizens' private fortunes to its own use.2 59
Thus, he perceived the taking clause not only a means of pre-
serving private property but as a shield against arbitrary, un-
fair, or tyrannical government. 6 °
To effect what he believed to be the purpose of the clause,
Professor Sax developed a theory grounded on the distinction
between government as an enterprise and government as an
arbiter.2 6 1 The operation of government as an enterprise, ac-
cording to Sax, entails economic competition with private en-
terprise for those resources directly enhancing governmental
functions.262 On the other hand, government in its arbital
capacity acts only to reconcile conflicts between private inter-
ests, producing no direct benefit to a governmental func-
tion. 63 Sax concluded that compensation is due for losses of
private property as a result of governmental enhancement of
255 See Berger, supra note 238, at 177.
-1; See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128.
25,7 Sax, supra note 164, at 177.
2r., Id. at 58-60.
n, Id at 60 (quoting 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION 547-48 (4th ed. 1873)).
2- Id. at 64.
1,;, Id. at 61-67.
262 Id at 62.
263 Id. at 62-63.
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its resource position in its enterprise capacity, whereas losses
incurred as consequence of governmental activity in an
arbital capacity are constitutionally noncompensable. 264
Following Sax's pronouncement of the enterprise-arbital
theory, the Supreme Court has cited examples of several cases
where compensation would have been required under this
theory, although the theory had not been developed when the
cases where decided.265 In one instance, by the overflight of
military aircraft at low altitudes, the government appropri-
ated the value of the land underlying the glide paths to the
benefit of a nearby airport.26 6 In another, the government
gained a servitude over the claimant's land by the repeated
firing of coastal defense guns over the land. 67 In a third, the
government acquired an easement in lands frequently
flooded as an incidence of the improvement of navigation.268
The Supreme Court, however, did apply the enterprise-
arbital theory in YMCA v. UnitledStates,269 concluding that no
taking had occurred. 27" The case arose following riots in Pan-
ama in 1964.271 Several United States Army troops were dis-
patched to the area of the riots, near the YMCA building. 27 2
By the time the troops arrived, the rioters had entered and
begun looting the YMCA building; the troops expelled the
rioters and took up positions outside the building.27 3 As the
riot intensified, the troops retreated into the building, which
then became the target of extensive fire-bombing.27 4
The YMCA brought suit against the United States in the
claims court, seeking compensation under the fifth amend-
ment for damages done by the rioters.2 75 The claims court
-- Id at 63.
2-"r, See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128.
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
.. See Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
2... See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
261, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
27,, Id. at 92.
d, I  at 87.
2 , Id at 87-88.
274 Id
171 Id at 86.
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held that the actions of the Army did not constitute a taking
under the fifth amendment.2 76 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the YMCA argued that the troops had entered the
building as part of the general defense of the canal zone. 77
The Court ruled to the contrary, indicating that the purpose
of dispatching the soldiers was to protect private property.278
The Court reasoned that where a private party "is the partic-
ular intended beneficiary" of governmental action, "fairness
and justice" do not require that the resulting losses be borne
by the public. 27
9
To borrow from the language of the Court in YMCA, the
historical evidence suggests that the intended beneficiaries of
the Convention at the time of its ratification by the United
States were private parties. The passengers benefited from
the resulting uniformity in the law governing an air disas-
ter.280 The liability limitation allowed the fledgling airlines
to become firmly established in the field of international
transportation.2 81 The limitation may have also advanced
uniformity in the law by encouraging acceptance of the Con-
vention among the numerous less developed nations of the
world. 82
Whether the Convention any longer serves interests other
than the United States Government's interest in maintaining
international cooperation is open to question.283 If indeed the
official statement of the American delegation to the Montreal
Conference can be accepted as true,284 a cogent argument can
be made that the government's acceptance of the Montreal
Agreement was in the nature of enhancement of national
prestige and power in its enterprise capacity. On the other
hand, the international aviation industry still has limited lia-
276 Id
277 Id at 90.
-a Id at 90-91.
279 Id at 92.
2- See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
-"' See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
202 See supra note 52.
2- See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
284 Id.
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bility, and uniformity in the laws still exists, 85 suggesting
governmental action in its arbital capacity.
How a court would resolve the taking question under the
enterprise-arbital theory is unclear. Professor Sax, however,
provided some insight as to how difficult taking questions
might be analyzed under his theory. He would first ask
whether the case was one of individual cost-bearing of some
public endeavor."8 6 Since the burden under the Convention
falls solely upon those injured in international air travel as
opposed to all other transportation, the answer to this ques-
tion is arguably yes. To resolve the taking question, Sax
would then ask whether the loss was a private loss inuring to
the benefit of a government enterprise.287 Whether the an-
swer to the second question is affirmative will depend upon a
plaintiff's ability to marshal sufficient evidence to show that
the government indeed used his right to recovery as a "bar-
gaining chip ' 288 in international relations through the ac-
ceptance of the Montreal Agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the Warsaw Convention's liability limitation can
ultimately be proven a taking without just compensation
under the fifth amendment is impossible to predict. The out-
come depends upon a series of uncertain issues, of which some
are more indeterminate than others. It is conceivable, how-
ever, to successfully prove that the liability limitation is a tak-
ing under the scenario suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Bak.
The premise underlying the Bali scenario, that a plaintiff
2M See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
" Sax, supra note 164, at 76.
•2,' Id Sax actually speaks in terms of economic benefit accruing to the government
from the appropriation of tangible property. Id at 63-76. His logic applies with equal
force, however, to the appropriation of an intangible property right where the benefit
accruing to the government is in the form of international comity, for the risks Sax
indentified as underlying his theory are also present in this instance. See Sax, supra note
164, at 64-67.
8' See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("The Government must pay just compensation when it fur-
thers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully
held by a relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our courts").
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may initially bring a wrongful death action under state law,
appears to rest upon a solid foundation: the existence of a
nonexclusive right of action under the Convention is amply
supported by authority. 28 9 The ability of a Bab* plaintiff to
invoke the jurisdiction of the claims court also appears fairly
290certain.
Establishing the elements of a taking claim itself, on the
other hand, is not assured. Neither, however, is it impossible.
Rather, the apparent inconsistencies in the decisions under
the fifth amendment precludes any degree of certainty in the
outcome of a taking challenge until judgment has actually
been rendered.29'
While this area of the law is certainly in a quandary, a few
observations may nonetheless be made. Persuading the
claims court that a compensable property interest exists in a
right of action at state law will indeed be difficult. Though
analogous cases in support of a Bali plaintiff's position are
certainly to be found,292 those decisions focusing on the dis-
tinction between vested and nonvested rights in the determi-
nation of "property" cast grave doubt on the likelihood of
achieving just compensation under the fifth amendment.293
Yet, if the existence of "property" can be proven so that the
various tests which determine when property is "taken" are
applied to the Convention's limitation on rights of action
under state law, the result is more unclear than
discouraging.2 94
Furthermore, if, as the commentators have unanimously
declared, the courts have not engaged in any principled basis
of decision making in the cases arising under the taking
clause,295 the context in which the claim arises and the consti-
tutional implications of a decision favorable to the plaintiff
are noteworthy. The fact that the Convention is a treaty
- See supra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
- See supra notes 116-159 and accompanying text.
-1 See supra note 164.
292 See supra notes 166-204 and accompanying text.
-1 See supra notes 205-232 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 233-288 and accompanying text.
-, See supra note 164.
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could perhaps have some bearing on the claims court's incli-
nation to declare it a taking. For example, the Supreme
Court has never invalidated a treaty intimately related to for-
eign affairs on the ground that it was beyond the power of the
federal government. 96 Under the taking clause in particular,
the Supreme Court has refused to scrutinize any settlement
by the United States and a foreign government when the re-
sulting treaty vested Congress with the discretion to compen-
sate the private claimants.297  Additionally, the fact that
awarding a Bah plaintiff the compensation he seeks under the
fifth amendment would necessarily entail a constitutional
proscription on the powers of Congress vis-a-vis the states
might be influential. On several occasions, the Court has
cautioned judges against hastily reading limitations on legis-
lative power into the Constitution.298 Finally, the Court has
also hinted that the financial ability of the United States to
compensate a class of claimants may have some influence
upon the outcome of a taking claim.2 9 9
Considerations not at odds with sound policy and institu-
tional integrity exist, however, to rebut the foregoing sources
of influence upon the court faced with a Bah plaintiff's con-
tentions. The taking clause was designed to prevent the gov-
ernment from "forcing some people to bear public burdens
9- HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 208 (1972).
2- Id. at 263.
-1 See Nobel State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (caution-
ing judges against reading a "nolumus mulare as against the law-making power" into the
Constitution while rejecting a challenge under the taking clause to a change in state
law). See also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (stating that to accept a claim under the taking clause that the common
law of trespass is not subject to revision by the states would represent a return to the
Lochner era); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1917) (stating that the
rules of the common law affecting social relations are not placed beyond the law-mak-
ing power of the states by the fourteenth amendment); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 386 (1898) (stating in response to a due process challenge under the fourteenth
amendment to the regulation of working hours of miners that "while the cardinal prin-
ciples of justice are immutable," the methods of administering justice are subject to
change and that the Constitution, which is exceedingly difficult to amend, should not
be construed as depriving the states of the power to amend their laws).
-, See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 423 (1922)). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 460 n.2
(1978) (suggesting that the ability to limit recovery costs might result in the extension
of compensation).
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which in all fairness and juslice should be borne by the public
as a whole. ' 300 To fulfill this purpose, the Court has essen-
tially engaged in value judgments as to the propriety of
awarding compensation when deciding a case arising under
the taking clause.3 ' Obviously the liability limitation im-
posed under the Convention no longer comports with the
American concept of fairness.30 2 In addition, the interna-
tional political stagnation marking the history of the Conven-
tion has for fifty years prevented the normal legislative
process from accommodating the evolving values of society,
which have come to favor full compensation for losses suf-
fered. An argument can be made then, that the courts should
take a very activist role whenever confronted with a contro-
versy involving the Convention.30 3 Deference to the political
branches of the federal government, because the Convention
is a treaty or because a favorable resolution would to some
extent delimit legislative authority, is not compelled nor is it
consistent with fairness and justice toward the victim of an
international air disaster.
In assessing whether, or how, to proceed with a constitu-
tional challenge to the Convention under the taking clause, a
Bah plaintiff should not casually dismiss the significance of
the notions of fairness embodied in the taking clause. The
confusion prevalent in this area of the law itself attests to the
fact that ultimately fairness is a strong force in the resolution
of taking cases. Whether fairness would be the dominant
consideration in a court's decision remains to be seen. The
Bali plaintiff, however, who is twice the victim, first of an air
disaster, and second of the unreasonably low liability limita-
tion imposed under the Convention, may very well be the one
plaintiff who can prevail under the taking clause despite con-
siderable adversity.
... Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See also supra notes 161-163,
255, 286-287 and accompanying text.
:- See supra text accompanying notes 233-235.
N.2 See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
,.,. See L. TRIBE, supra note 299, at 929-30. Professor Tribe first recognized "political
logjams" as a rationale for judicial activism in the context of the right to abortion. Id
